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SUMMARYThe era of cheap food is over.  Cereals prices have increased by
66 percent in the last year and are bound to remain well above historical
averages in the medium term. A combination of negative supply shocks –
particularly high oil prices – and positive demand shocks – increased
demand from emerging economies and biofuels – mean that higher food
prices are here to stay.  A reduction in consumption is not likely, making
adjustments in supply necessary if the upward trend in agricultural prices
is to come to a halt. Increasing acreage worldwide and raising productivity
– especially in developing countries – should be at the top of the agenda.
But the new global environment also requires the adaptation of existing
EU policies, particularly those related to biofuels, trade and development.
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Innovation in biofuels should be encouraged but biofuels targets should
be abandoned as they are expensive and distort agricultural and energy
markets. We also need freer trade for
both efficiency and food security
reasons. But more open markets will
increase further the price of food for
importing countries. An immediate and
sustained increase in international
assistance should therefore be agreed,
aimed at alleviating the impact of high
food prices in poor countries in the
short term and at increasing produc-
tivity in those regions in the longer
term. Current aid commitments are
insufficient by a large margin given
the magnitude of the shock experi-
enced in several poor economies.
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THE NEW FOOD EQUATION: DO EU POLICIES ADD UP?
AFTER DECADES OF CHEAP FOOD
1,
agricultural prices increased non-
stop in the first months of 2008.
The greatest increase has been in
cereals prices, especially corn and
wheat (Figure 1). In real terms,
while still below the price levels
seen in the 1970s, cereals prices
have increased by 66 percent
since July 2007 (Figure 2). 
Although the outlook remains
uncertain, projections indicate
that prices – while lower than in
previous months – will remain
higher than the average in the past
two decades. This represents a
major change, especially for con-
sumers in developing countries
where food consumption remains
a very large proportion – between
30 and 60 percent – of household
budgets. While a 50 percent rise in
the price of staples leads to an
increase in the share of food in
total household income of less
than one percentage point in a
developed country, it represents a
rise of over 10 percentage points
in poorer ones (Table 1).
The recent spike in food prices
takes place in tandem with a more
generalised increase in commodi-
ty prices (especially oil), new bio-
fuel policies and exceptional
growth in large countries such as
China and India. These new long-
term forces interact with cyclical
factors exacerbating the food situ-
ation, in particular adverse
weather shocks, lax monetary
policy and possible speculative
positions in agricultural products. 
The public debate started by trying
to understand the reasons behind
the price increase and the emer-
gence of a new food equation, but
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Figure 1: Real commodity prices 2006-2008
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Figure 2: Cereal and oil real prices 1980-2008
Source: Bruegel calculations based on IMF Commodity Price Index. Note: Deflated by US CPI as a
reference, notwithstanding that this index does not necessarily reflect the impact on prices in
developing countries due to differences in consumption patterns and the dollar depreciation.
Source: Bruegel calculations based on IMF Commodity Price Index and US CPI deflator. See also
note under Figure 1.
Table 1
Impact of higher prices on household budgets
Developed
country
Developing
country
Household income (€) 40000 1000
Food expenditure (€) 6000 500
Food as % of income 15% 50%
Staples as % of food expenditure 20% 70%
Expenditure on staples (€) 1200 350
Increased expenditure due to 50% price rise (€) 360 105
Increased expenditure as % income 0.9% 10.5%
Source: Bruegel calculations and Trostle (2008). Assumption: 50 percent increase in price of
staples and 60 percent pass-through.
1In developing
countries food prices
are more closely related
to agricultural prices
than in developed
economies, where
distribution and retail
costs are more
relevant. In this policy
brief, we focus on agri-
cultural prices rather
than food prices,
although we use the
terms interchangeably.THE NEW FOOD EQUATION: DO EU POLICIES ADD UP?
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it is time to shift the focus of dis-
cussion towards the role of EU
policies and how they should be
adjusted to the changes in the
food equation. This is the approach
followed in this policy brief: first,
we briefly describe the relevant
factors driving up food prices; sec-
ond, we address why the reaction
of supply has been sluggish and,
third, we analyse EU biofuels,
trade and development policies in
light of the recent developments.
1. A NEW FOOD EQUATION
Are high prices here to stay? Some
of the factors driving the recent
spike in prices are temporary
shocks to the food equation while
others imply permanent changes.
On the one hand, droughts, floods
and other weather-related shocks
rarely occur in all parts of the world
at the same time; even in places
that are prone to this type of event,
their occurrence is cyclical. Other
macroeconomic and financial
factors, including possible specu-
lative positions in commodities
markets, are also temporary.
Drought in large wheat-producing
countries such as Australia and
Ukraine, floods in Asia and dry
weather in the US, the EU and
Canada have all negatively affect-
ed world agricultural production.
However, bad crops in some
regions may be counterbalanced
by good crops in others. In
Australia and Canada, for instance,
adverse weather led to a combined
fall of over 20 percent in
production per hectare of wheat
and other grains between 2005
and 2007
2. But, in the same
period, Brazil’s production per
hectare went up by 31 percent. In
the longer term, global warming is
likely to increase the frequency of
extreme weather conditions.
Evidence of the role of financial
investors in the price rise is incon-
clusive. The relatively lower return
on traditional assets might have
driven investors to increase the
share of food commodities in their
portfolio. Yet stocks have
decreased to their lowest levels
since the early 1980s (Figure 3),
suggesting that inventories are
being used to meet today’s needs.
On the other hand, in a market
where short-run supply and
demand are inelastic, prices will
go up rapidly if investors attempt
to stockpile commodities. In such
a case, financial speculation
might be consistent with low
inventories. 
Other factors entail a structural
change in the food equation. Two
are of special relevance: 1)
increasing food demand arising
from unprecedented economic
growth in highly populated
countries such as China and India,
and rising production of biofuels;
and 2) increasing input prices –
especially energy.
A significant part of the developing
world has performed exceptionally
strongly over the last decade. The
case of China is well known, with
annual growth rates above 10
percent in most of the last 15
years. This rapid growth in emerg-
ing economies, together with an
increase in population, has trans-
lated into both a rise in demand for
major agricultural crops (Figure 4,
overleaf) and a change in the com-
position of diet, which has become
more meat-based. 
As a result of the move towards a
more meat-based diet, demand for
feed has multiplied in developing
countries. Annual per capita meat
consumption in China rose from
34kg to 49 kg between 1997 and
2007, implying that around 20
percent of the worldwide increase
in grain and oilseed demand
between 1997 and 2007 is attrib-
utable to the switch to meat in
China. In fact, more than 80
percent of the increase in Chinese
grain and oilseed demand stems
from diet changes (Figure 5, over-
leaf). From a policy standpoint this
is important, since even if popula-
tion growth in China stays at
2OECD-FAO, 2008,
Agricultural Outlook
2008-2017.
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Figure 3: Historically low inventories
Source: Bruegel calculations based on OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017 Database.b
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THE NEW FOOD EQUATION: DO EU POLICIES ADD UP?
today’s level, a growing Chinese
middle class will continue to shift
towards a meat-based diet, thus
sustaining the upward pressure on
prices.
In the last two decades, grain
production for biofuels has
increased by a factor of ten. The
increase has been especially pro-
nounced since 2005 (Figure 4).
Biofuels have started to play a
relevant role in agricultural mar-
kets. Some countries, notably
Brazil, implemented programmes
to promote the use of biofuels in
the early 1970s. However, it was
not until recent years that the US
and the EU set ambitious targets
for the use of biofuels in the next
decade
3. US ethanol will already
account for one third of the coun-
try’s corn crop in the 2009-10 sea-
son (USDA, 2008). These targets
effectively guarantee a demand
for biofuels and, consequently, for
the crops used as inputs (mainly
corn in the US, wheat and rape-
seed in the EU and sugar in Brazil).
Such programmes also involve
substantial subsidies, introducing
additional distortions in agricultur-
al markets.
Although biofuels today account
for a very small fraction of the
global liquid fuels supply (1.5
percent), their share is rapidly
increasing. Since the amount of
corn necessary to produce biofu-
els is large, this translates into
pressing demand for inputs
4. US
biofuel production alone accounts
for almost half of the increase in
demand for grains and oilseeds in
2006-2008 (Figure 4).
It is clear that biofuels affect food
prices, as they constitute an addi-
tional source of demand. Despite
the low proportion of biofuels in
total current grain consumption,
biofuel targets and subsidies are a
strong political commitment that
is already feeding into current
prices. Today’s prices partly incor-
porate future demand growth
expectations.
The upward pressure on food
prices exerted by biofuels not only
operates directly via higher food
crop demand but also indirectly via
competition for land use and other
resources. Even in the case of sec-
ond-generation biofuels which will
make use of energy-only crops,
this indirect effect would not dis-
appear. The US Department of
Agriculture forecasts a long-term
shift of acreage towards corn in
response to increasing prices
derived from the growth in domes-
tic corn-based ethanol production.
Corn acreage will go in the US from
32 percent of total planted acreage
in 2006 to 38 percent in 2017.
This will also have an effect on
prices of alternative crops.
Finally, on the supply side, since
2005  oil prices have doubled in
real terms (Figure 2), translating
into higher costs for the agricultur-
al sector via energy use (operation
of machinery and transport) and
oil-based fertilisers. Oil prices are
expected to remain high as
demand for oil increases and
supply remains rigid.
The relative contribution to higher
prices of each of the factors
analysed above is hard to disen-
tangle. However, what is clear is
that some factors have a perma-
nent impact on the food equation:
a negative long-term effect on
supply and a positive long-term
effect on demand (Table 2). If
3The 2007 US Energy
Independence and
Security Act requires
American fuel produc-
ers to use at least 36
billion gallons of biofuel
in 2022. In Europe,
Directive 2003/30/EC
sets indicative targets
for biofuels. The recent
climate action package
under discussion at the
European Parliament
establishes a binding
10 percent share for
biofuels in petrol and
diesel by 2020.
4The amount of corn
necessary to fill a car
tank with bioethanol –
232 kilos – is equiva-
lent to the annual corn
consumption of a child.
In addition, 1.5 litres of
ethanol is required to
provide the same
amount of energy as a
litre of petrol.
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Figure 4: Breakdown of the increase in global
consumption of major food crops
Source: Bruegel calculations based on OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017 Database and USDA PS&D database.
Note: ‘Major food crops’ here means coarse grains, wheat, rice and oilseeds.
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Figure 5: Origin of increased Chinese demand for
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higher prices are here to stay, the
question is if and when supply will
respond. We address this issue in
the next section.
2. BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND
In a market without distortions, an
increase in demand and a conse-
quent increase in prices would
trigger an increase in production.
However, in agriculture – even if
arable land is readily available – a
supply response will not materi-
alise at least until the next harvest
season. In the meantime, excess
demand might be met by running
down inventories. 
Protective policy measures recent-
ly put in place by some countries
are an additional factor constrain-
ing the supply response to higher
prices. On the one hand, exporting
countries such as Argentina,
China, Russia and Malaysia have
reacted by imposing export taxes,
and others like Egypt, Vietnam and
India have banned exports of cer-
tain commodities altogether in
order to reduce pressure on
domestic prices. This has
exacerbated the supply shortage.
Supply can adjust through an
increase in productivity or in land
under cultivation. In the last two
years, total acreage under crops
has barely changed while demand
for grains and oilseeds has
increased by five and nine percent
respectively. As production has
increased at a lower rate than
demand, stocks have been driven
down (Figure 3). 
On average, productivity growth –
based on yields per hectare – has
gone in developed economies from
1.8 percent per year in 1970-1980
surge in demand. So far, increases
in productivity had largely
explained increases in production
without any major expansion in
acreage (Figure 6). However, an
abrupt rise in demand with contin-
ued poor productivity growth
might lead to prolonged and more
frequent supply and demand gaps,
as it takes time for more land to be
brought into production.
The potential exists to bring new
land into cultivation – in Latin
America, sub-Saharan Africa and
the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States
6. The EU has just agreed
in principle to suspend the require-
ment that farmers ‘set aside’ 10
percent of their arable land
7, which
to 2.8 percent in 1995-2005, but
from 2.2 percent to 1.8 percent in
developing economies. The
progress witnessed in developing
countries in the 1970s and early
1980s during the ‘green revolu-
tion’ has slowed. These averages
mask major differences in produc-
tivity across regions that have
been widening in the last two
decades, with yields in sub-
Saharan Africa lagging behind. This
low productivity growth is attribut-
able to small farm sizes, land
degradation, low investment in irri-
gation and poor human capital
5.
This fall in productivity growth in
key producing regions has become
more pressing with the recent
5World Development
Report, 2008.
6OECD-FAO, 2008,
Agricultural Outlook
2008-2017.
7European
Commission, Proposal
for a Council Regulation
establishing common
rules for direct support
schemes for farmers
under the common agri-
cultural policy and
establishing certain
support schemes for
farmers, Brussels, 20
May 2008, COM(2008)
306 final.
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Figure 6: Cereals production, yield and area harvested
Source: Bruegel calculations based on USDA data.
Table 2
Effect of selected factors on the food equation
Factor Short term Long term
Weather Positive and negative
weather shocks will
continue
Climate change could
increase frequency of
extreme events
Input prices Oil prices are predicted to stay high, increasing
input costs permanently
Economic and population
growth in emerging economies
Likely to be accentuated as a larger proportion of the
population gets richer and as urbanisation continues
Biofuels Bound to increase as targets get set, technology
improves and price of oil stays highTHE NEW FOOD EQUATION: DO EU POLICIES ADD UP?
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could bring four million hectares of
arable land back into production.
Further increases in acreage will
take time. In addition, urbanisa-
tion in rapidly growing countries
will reduce the amount of land
available for agriculture. 
There are some signs that supply
is responding to the price incen-
tive: the USDA expects record grain
crops next year in the US. But this
may not be enough to offset an
increase in demand. If demand for,
and production of, cereals contin-
ue to grow at the same rate as
they did between 2005 and 2007,
then by 2015 there will be a
production shortfall of 10 percent
8.
This potential gap, if not matched
by higher productivity or more
acreage, would be accompanied by
even higher prices. The bottom line
is that prices are likely to remain
high by historical standards, with a
fall expected to start in 2010, but
price levels still well above those
observed at the beginning of this
decade. In comparison to today’s
levels, the World Bank estimates
that the price of corn will decrease
by 15 percent and the price of
wheat by 30 percent in real terms
by 2015. 
As a consequence of the combina-
tion of permanent demand and
supply shocks, food prices are set
to remain high in the medium
term. Responses from supply to
this new situation should come
from a) an increase in productivity
in developing countries and b) an
increase in acreage worldwide.
This new equilibrium of high food
prices changes the context in
which policies are developed. In
the next section we revisit EU bio-
fuels, trade and development
policies in the new global scenario.  
3.RETHINKING POLICIES UNDER
THE NEW FOOD EQUATION
Biofuels 
The recent proposal of the
European Commission to increase
the share of biofuels in transport
to ten percent of total fuel
consumption has become contro-
versial on two counts: first, the
impact of biofuels on food prices
has driven some to advocate the
abandonment or postponement of
the target; second, recent scientif-
ic evidence casts doubt on the
effectiveness of biofuels in reduc-
ing carbon emissions on account
of land-use change
9.
Biofuels constitute
the main measure
proposed hitherto by
the European
Commission to
address greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in the transport sector.
The declared objectives of EU bio-
fuels targets are to reduce oil
dependence and GHG emissions.
Should the EU relax its biofuels tar-
gets in order to reduce pressure on
food prices? Before answering this
question, it should be clarified
whether biofuels actually con-
tribute to the objectives set.
Biofuels do not contribute to
energy security. Biofuels might
reduce oil dependence but at a
cost above that of oil. The cost of
biodiesel is expected to be above
the cost of fossil diesel for the next
decade
10. Subsidising biofuels
risks being an expensive insur-
ance policy to hedge for high and
volatile oil prices. The impact
assessment carried out by the
Commission concludes that biofu-
els contribute to diversifying the
sources of supply for the high oil-
dependent transport sector and,
therefore, to supply security.
However, the benefits are
assessed only in qualitative
terms. They must also be
assessed quantitatively.
Biofuels are a costly way to
reduce emissions. It is not possi-
ble to generalise about the contri-
bution of biofuels to emissions
reduction. As a rough estimate,
while sugar cane-based ethanol
produced in Brazil reduces
emissions by 90 percent com-
pared to use of petroleum, corn-
based ethanol produced in the US
saves only 10-30
percent
11. Adding the
impact of land-use
change, transport to
the point of
consumption and
other indirect
emissions, the total balance can
be negative. In order to guarantee
a positive balance, the European
Commission introduces the princi-
ple of ‘environmental sustainabili-
ty’, whereby biofuels must comply
with certain minimum require-
ments in order to qualify towards
achieving the targets. The require-
ment that emissions savings from
the use of biofuels be at least 35
percent – and the additional
regulatory architecture necessary
to implement it – considerably
increase the cost of producing bio-
fuels.
However, even if the sustainability
criteria were strictly applied, the
question is whether it is cost-
efficient to reduce emissions by
using biofuels. The purpose of the
European emissions trading
market is to bring about emissions
reduction at minimum cost.
‘Biofuels targets are
an obstacle to
emissions reduction.’
8Between 2005 and
2007, production grew
by three percent and
consumption by five
percent.
9See Searchinger et al,
2008.
10OECD-FAO Agricultural
Outlook 2008-2017.
11World Development
Report 2008, Focus B,
Biofuels: the promise
and the risks.THE NEW FOOD EQUATION: DO EU POLICIES ADD UP?
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According to a recent report by the
UK environment ministry
(DEFRA)
12, the estimated cost of
carbon abatement through biofu-
els in 2020 will be on average
€132.6/tCO2 (with wide varia-
tions depending on the crop), well
above the 2020 shadow price of
carbon of €41.9/tCO2
13. Having a
specific target for biofuels will sub-
stantially increase the cost of
reducing emissions and is there-
fore an obstacle to reaching the EU
emissions reduction target.
Leaving aside the unintended
impact on agricultural prices, bio-
fuels are thus not the most
effective and cost-efficient tool to
secure energy supply and reduce
emissions. Thus, setting ambitious
biofuels targets has no purpose
and can even be counterproduc-
tive for tackling climate change.
Targets should be abandoned.This
does not imply that research and
innovation in alternative sources
of energy, including second-gener-
ation biofuels, should be dropped.
Furthermore, if oil prices continue
rising, biofuels (or any other alter-
native) will develop naturally with-
out government support. For
example, Brazilian bioethanol is a
competitive alternative to oil at
the current prices. Ending specific
biofuels subsidies does not neces-
sarily mean the end of biofuels
and, consequently, their impact on
agricultural markets will be long-
lasting.
Trade and development policy
The recent surge in food prices has
put agricultural trade at the centre
of policy discussions in Europe
and the rest of the world. Many
have called for more protective
measures and maintenance of
support for farmers. Notably,
France’s farm minister, Michel
Barnier, has argued for every
region in the world to have its own
common agricultural policy (CAP)
and for the EU to operate a policy
of ‘European preference’ in order to
secure food supplies
14.
But food security does not mean
self-sufficiency.In a world of glob-
al scarcity, we need to make the
best use of land and other
resources. This implies producing
where it is most efficient to do so,
and liberalising trade so that accu-
rate price signals can be sent
worldwide and products reach
markets. Global integration, and
not regionalism, is the way to
make the most of scarce
resources. 
Simulations of the effects of free
trade indicate how it would help in
mobilising resources to improve
supply. Free trade would imply a
shift of production from rich
countries to less developed
countries where production is, in
global terms, more efficient. In
high-income countries, the ratio
between production and
consumption would decline from
101 to 94 under free trade
(Anderson et al. 2006). Free trade
would also lead to an overall
increase in global welfare as
production becomes more
efficient (Figure 7). It is estimated
that developing countries would
collectively gain 0.8 percent of
GDP, while the gain would be 0.6
percent of GDP for developed
countries. This might look modest,
but is close to the unfulfilled 0.7
percent development aid commit-
ment made six years ago. 
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Figure 7: Welfare gains from free trade in agriculture
Source: Anderson et al.2006 (Figure 7); Hertel et al.2007 (Figure 8).
Note: Gains by 2015 from eliminating tariffs and subsidies existing in 2001 as a percentage of real GDP in 2015.
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Figure 8: Distribution of gains from free trade
12See Deconti, 2008.
13The shadow price of
carbon is an estimate
of the costs of the dam-
age caused by one
additional tonne of
carbon being emitted
into the atmosphere.
14‘Europe’s CAP the
answer to food prices’,
Ben Hall, Financial
Times, 27 April, 2008.THE NEW FOOD EQUATION: DO EU POLICIES ADD UP?
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What about the distribution of the
benefits? While free trade benefits
the world as a whole, poor food-
importing countries may be worse
off. Some poor countries would lose
out significantly. Agricultural trade
liberalisation would push prices up
on average, owing mainly to the
removal of subsidies in developed
economies, which artificially
depress the price of products trad-
ed internationally. This price rise
would have efficiency effects since
it would provide incentives to pro-
ducers to produce more. Large net
exporters like Brazil would gain via
higher exports and revenues. Rich
countries would gain via lower sub-
sidies to agriculture. But net food
importers such as Mozambique and
Bangladesh would lose out (Figure
8). This price rise as a consequence
of liberalisation could add to the
upward pressure on prices, exacer-
bating the problem for food-import-
ing developing countries.
Let us take the examples of
Mozambique and Bangladesh, for
which the price surge has dramati-
cally increased the cost of food
imports. Bangladeshis and
Mozambiqueans today pay USD
1.5 billion more for their food
imports than in 2005. Trade liberal-
isation exacerbates this deteriora-
tion of their purchasing power and
their welfare. Under free trade,
welfare would fall in these
countries by 0.3 and 0.5 percent,
respectively (Figure 8).
This makes the case for aid
stronger. Uneven distribution of
the gains from free trade and the
recent price hike call for increased
international aid for those low-
income countries that are
adversely affected. Such interna-
tional aid should target the most
vulnerable consumers in poor
countries and should assist devel-
oping countries in finding ways to
increase productivity in the agri-
cultural sector. In the recent FAO
high-level summit on food prices,
governments committed to an
additional USD 1.2 billion in aid for
all developing countries to cope
with the crisis. Merely compensat-
ing Bangladesh for the recent rise
in food prices would absorb all of
this amount. Hence, this addition-
al assistance is not nearly enough.
In short, we need more trade liber-
alisation to secure food provision
and increase welfare. But we also
need more aid at the international
level to help the poorest countries
deal with the current negative
price shock and with the potential
effects of liberalisation. Also,
assistance should be provided to
increase substantially the
efficiency of the agricultural
sector in developing countries.
This would not necessarily require
additional commitments – several
EU countries are still far below
their development assistance tar-
get of 0.7% of gross national
income. Now is thus not a time for
promises, it is a time for delivery.
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